Group Size, Kant-Nash Interaction, and Public Goods

Julian Lamprecht

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2025, vol. 81, issue 1, 37-58

Abstract: This paper considers the private provision of a public good within a community, whose members are inclusive Kantian or Nashian optimizers. It is analyzed how a change in group size affects the mixed Kant-Nash equilibrium. Kantians face a trade-off when admitting a Nashian into the community. Even though the new member is a contributor, there is a negative externality, as the Kantians' hypothetical cost of public good provision falls in group size. This can lead to a lower utility of Kantian individuals.

Keywords: kantian optimization; private provision of public goods; free-riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1628/fa-2025-0004

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