Preisdumping und Steuerdumping - wie weit reicht die Parallele?

Gerold Krause-Junk

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 1999, vol. 56, issue 1, 86-103

Abstract: The European Tax Code can be interpreted as an instrument against tax dumping. It therefore may be questioned along the same lines as the antidumping rules of GATT: Are price (respectively tax-) differentials really unfair and detrimental for foreign economies? However, the parallel ends when regarding the typical character of public goods and of taxes as opposed to prices. There is no fair price for using public goods. And whether low foreign taxes are detrimental from the point of view of capital exporting countries does not depend on any tax differentials in favour of imported capital and foreign firms. But it may be unfair indeed to prevent the implementation of internationally accepted tax principles, e.g. by dissolving the comprehensive income tax.

Date: 1999
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