Time, Self-Selection and User Charges for Public Goods
Dan Anderberg (),
Fredrik Andersson () and
Alessandro Balestrino ()
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2000, vol. 57, issue 2, 137-
Many public goods generate utility only when combined with a time-input. Important examples include road networks and publicly provided leisure facilities. If it is possible to charge for the time spent using the public good it is generally a second-best Pareto optimal policy to do so even in the absence of congestion. An optimal linear user charge is analyzed within a standard optimum income-tax framework. Second-best public good provision in the presence of a user charge is also characterized and factors that influence the direction of optimal distortion of the public good supply are identified.
JEL-codes: H21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Working Paper: Time, Self-Selection and User Charges for Public Goods (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200103)57:2_137:tsaucf_2.0.tx_2-g
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Access Statistics for this article
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis is currently edited by Alfons Weichenrieder, Ronnie Schöb and Katherine Cuff
More articles in FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Series data maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().