Recycling, Producer Responsibility and Centralized Waste Management

Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2001, vol. 57, issue 3, 333-360

Abstract: This paper examines a Waste Management Organisation's (WMO) pricing options to implement the Pareto-efficient allocation in an economy where materials are first extracted, then used for producing a consumption good and finally recycled or landfilled. The composition of consumption waste results from the producers' product design and affects the productivity of secondary material generation. The incentives of various pricing strategies for inducing an efficient (green) product design are studied. No simple and ideal scheme is found. The most favorable pricing strategies turn out to comprise of positive or negative fees on producers based on residuals and material inputs.

JEL-codes: H21 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/recycling-p ... 16280015221012904922
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
Working Paper: Recycling, Producer Responsibility and Centralized Waste Management (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200105)57:3_333:rpracw_2.0.tx_2-e

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis is currently edited by Alfons Weichenrieder, Ronnie Schöb and Jean-François Tremblay

More articles in FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().