Redundancy Pay and Collective Dismissals

Laszlo Goerke

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2002, vol. 59, issue 1, 68-90

Abstract: Redundancy payments for collective dismissals are incorporated into a Shapiro-Stiglitz model of efficiency wages. It is shown that a lump-sum payment will lower wages, leaving employment and welfare unaffected if there are neither wage-dependent taxes nor additional firing costs. If payroll taxes exceed firing costs, employment and welfare will rise with redundancy payments. If these payments are also a function of previous wages or reduce unemployment benefits, positive employment effects will be mitigated or reversed. A substitution of wage-dependent for lump-sum redundancy payments can lower employment, allowing for a continuous variation of effort.

JEL-codes: J41 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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