A Mixed Duopoly with a Lifetime Employment Contract as a Strategic Commitment

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2006, vol. 62, issue 1, 108-123

Abstract: This paper examines the behaviors of a profit-maximizing private firm and a socialwelfare- maximizing public firm in a mixed market model with a lifetime employment contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists an equilibrium in which the private firm enters into a lifetime employment contract with its employees while the public firm does not.

Keywords: mixed duopoly; lifetime employment contract; Cournot model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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