Rank-Dependent Utility, Tax Evasion, and Labor Supply

Erling Eide, Kristine von Simson and Steinar Strøm ()

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2011, vol. 67, issue 3, 261-281

Abstract: In a portfolio model of tax evasion an expected utility maximizer will cheat more than what is estimated in empirical studies. At least two types of explanation have been suggested as solutions to this puzzle: (1) taxpayers act according to some unexpected utility theory, and (2) individual ethical norms and social stigma induce people not to cheat. Based on Norwegian survey data, we find that a rank-dependent expected-utility model performs better than an expected-utility model and that social norms matter in explaining behavior.

Keywords: labor supply; tax evasion; rank-dependent utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 D12 D81 H26 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/rank-depend ... 1628001522111x600597 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
Working Paper: Rank Dependent Utility, Tax Evasion and Labor Supply (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201109)67:3_261:ruteal_2.0.tx_2-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

DOI: 10.1628/001522108X600597

Access Statistics for this article

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis is currently edited by Alfons Weichenrieder, Ronnie Schöb and Jean-François Tremblay

More articles in FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().