Opportunities to Divert, Firm Value, and Taxation: Theory and Evidence from European Firms

Robert Krämer and Vilen Lipatov

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2012, vol. 68, issue 1, 17-47

Abstract: We study the relationship between opportunities for managerial diversion, corporate tax system parameters, and the return on shareholder funds. Theoretically, in a simple game between corporate insiders and outsiders, higher costs of diversion increase the return. European firm-level data lend support to these results. Further, in civil-law countries an increase in the corporate tax rate has a positive effect on shareholder value, whereas in common-law countries it has a negative effect.

Keywords: corporate governance; corporate taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 H25 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/opportuniti ... 1628001522112x632005 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201203)68:1_17:otdfva_2.0.tx_2-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

DOI: 10.1628/001522108X632005

Access Statistics for this article

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis is currently edited by Alfons Weichenrieder, Ronnie Schöb and Jean-François Tremblay

More articles in FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().