Identity, Incentives, and Their Dynamics in the Production of Publicly Provided Goods

Paolo Polidori and Désirée Teobaldelli

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2017, vol. 73, issue 1, 77-102

Abstract: This paper aims to clarify the role of government provision of valuable goods and services when (i) workers may be intrinsically motivated to exert effort and (ii) there are constraints on how production occurs. We analyze the optimal organization of production in a model where agents' preferences have a behavioral component and where some decisions are made by a central authority and others are made at a lower, decentralized level. In this framework we show that it may be optimal for the central authority to choose a relatively inefficient monitoring technology and to reduce monetary incentives. The mechanism driving this result is related to a general-equilibrium effect as mediated by the public-administration budget constraint and the firm's own composition of workers.

Keywords: identity; incentives; public-goods provision; public-service motivation; decentralized production (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L30 M50 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/identity-in ... 22117x14812837493029 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
Working Paper: Identity, incentives and their dynamics in the production of publicly provided goods (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201703)73:1_77:iiatdi_2.0.tx_2-v

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

DOI: 10.1628/001522108X14812837493029

Access Statistics for this article

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis is currently edited by Alfons Weichenrieder, Ronnie Schöb and Jean-François Tremblay

More articles in FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().