Migration-Induced Redistribution with and without Migrants' Voting

Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2018, vol. 74, issue 1, 158-172

Abstract: We are motivated by the unique migration experience of Israel, of a supply-side shock triggering skilled immigration and the concurrent decline in welfare-state redistribution. This paper develops a model that can provide an explanation for the mechanism through which a supply-side shock, triggering high-skill migration, can also reshape the political-economy balance and the redistributive policies. The paper highlights the differences in the political-economy-based redistribution policies between the cases in which migrants participate in the electoral system and the case in which they do not. When migrants are allowed to vote, and take advantage of this right, then, all income groups gain (in their net income), except the low-skilled immigrants, who lose. However, when migrants are not allowed to vote, or choose not to participate in elections, all income groups gain, except the skilled migrants who lose.

Keywords: immigration episode as a "natural experiment"; majority voting; progressivity of the welfare state; gainers and losers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 H24 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Related works:
Working Paper: Migration-Induced Redistribution with and without migrant voting (2017)
Working Paper: Migration-Induced Redistribution with and without Migrant's Voting (2017)
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DOI: 10.1628/001522117X15105745052709

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