Reflexive Game Theory Approach to Mutual Insurance Problem

Marko Backovic, Zoran Popovic and Mladen Stamenkovic

Montenegrin Journal of Economics, 2016, vol. 12, issue 3, 87-100

Abstract: This paper deals with application of game theory model to insurance market. We observed a form of mutual insurance in conditions of full and partial information obtained by insurance buyers. First part of the paper defines the model of non-cooperative game, followed by principles of optimality, types of stability and equilibrium. Here, model of non-cooperative game has been analyzed under the assumption that players are fully informed.

Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mje:mjejnl:v:12:y:2016:i:3:p:87-100

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