The Neoinstitutional Contracts Theory: New Perspectives

Oleg Sukharev

Montenegrin Journal of Economics, 2012, vol. 8, issue 1, 87-118

Abstract: A new version of the contracts theory in terms of economic agent's interaction analysis, their competition, ideas about unfavorable selection, legal efficiency/inefficiency, institutions dysfunction is elaborated in the article. The author evaluates efficiency criteria and offers his own model of effective contracting, considers conditions and restrictions of contract interactions of agents subject to the model of agents' behaviour in a view to legal efficiency and opportunism. The critical estimation of O. Williamson's contracts theory is given and the author's classification of contracts and the basis of the contract theory corresponding to the changed format of modern contracting on a microeconomic level are suggested.

Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.mnje.com/mje/2012/v08-n01/mje_2012_v08-n01-a13.pdf (application/pdf)
http://repec.mnje.com/mje/2012/v08-n01/mje_2012_v08-n01-a13.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mje:mjejnl:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:87-118

Access Statistics for this article

Montenegrin Journal of Economics is currently edited by Veselin Draskovic

More articles in Montenegrin Journal of Economics from Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nikola Draskovic Jelcic ().