Effects of Corporate Ownership Structure on Earnings Conservatism
Fan-Hua Kung,
Chia-Ling Cheng and
Kieran James
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting, 2010, vol. 2, issue 1, 4767
Abstract:
This paper investigates the incremental effects of corporate ownership structure on earnings conservatism, examining data of Chinese listed companies. We employ the concept of conditional conservatism to define earnings conservatism and adopt empirical models developed by Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) to measure the degree of earnings conservatism. Our empirical results show that the earnings of companies with higher non-tradable shares have lower earnings conservatism. Consistent with prior studies, this point demonstrates that the companies with state and concentrated ownership structures are more likely to depend on private communication to reduce information asymmetry and to resolve agency problems internally, thereby creating a low demand for earnings conservatism. The results of this study contribute to our understanding of how companies’ ownership structures affect the properties of earnings in emerging markets and post-Communist markets. Keywords- earnings conservatism, non-tradable shares, ownership structure, post-Communist studies, split-share structure, state ownership JEL Classifications- M40, M41, M49
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ajfa/article/view/431 (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mth:ajfa88:v:2:y:2010:i:1:p:47-67
Access Statistics for this article
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting is currently edited by Sofia Anderson
More articles in Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting from Macrothink Institute
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Technical Support Office ().