CEO Cash Compensation and Firm Performance: An Empirical Study from Emerging Markets

Nana Osei-Bonsu () and Joseph George M. Lutta ()

Business and Economic Research, 2016, vol. 6, issue 2, 79-99

Abstract: The primary objective of this study is to examine whether the CEO's cash compensation is influenced by the firm's performance or whether the inverse relationship exists, where the CEO's bonus rather has a positive effect on company performance. The study includes an examination of firms listed on six emerging countries financial markets, and includes separate statistical tests on firms of different sizes and different industry sector. The findings of the study demonstrate that there is no relationship between CEO cash compensation and performance among the firms included in this study. Notwithstanding, some other incentive variables have been found as important performance boosters among companies in certain sectors. This study has been able to establish that some theories of incentive contracts hold true among firms of certain sizes as well as among firms from certain industries.

Keywords: CEO; Cash Compensation; Performance; Incentive Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber/article/view/9805/7954 (application/pdf)
http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber/article/view/9805 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mth:ber888:v:6:y:2016:i:2:p:79-99

Access Statistics for this article

Business and Economic Research is currently edited by Daisy Young

More articles in Business and Economic Research from Macrothink Institute
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Technical Support Office ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).