Riforma regolamentare, privatizzazione ed investimenti: un'analisi empirica

Paola Garrone

L'industria, 2006, issue 1, 145-172

Abstract: This paper empirically analyses the effects of regulatory reform and new ownership and control patterns on firm-level investments. The sample includes European telecommunication incumbents in the period 1995-2003. When privatization and corporate restructuring programs are taken into account, market structure and regulation result to have a mixed or not significant role. State-owned enterprises are estimated to invest more in their networks due to a looser governance; firms that have been privatized through public offering invest comparatively less, unless managers enjoy some degree of discretion.

Date: 2006
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