Inter-firm Coordination: The Role of R&D Consortia

Luca Correani, Giuseppe Garofalo and Elisabetta Neri

L'industria, 2009, issue 1, 123-148

Abstract: The paper suggests a formulation of innovations implementation and transfer processes in the sphere of evolutionary games theory. The original model, in which uncooperative behaviours on the part of firms tend to prevail, is representative of the mistrust in establishing partnership, that we note in a productive system, like the Italian one, formed by SMEs. In order to obtain cooperative solutions as game outcome, it is necessary the participation of metamanagement institutions as the consortia assisted by local institutions (universities included). In two variants of our model, we study how by "one-to-many" (not any more by "one-to-one") interactions, and by repeated interactions, in addition to local institutions governance, cooperation can emerge and spread.

Keywords: R&D; Cooperation; Technological Consortia; Evolutionary Games; Local Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:j0hje1:doi:10.1430/29161:y:2009:i:1:p:123-148

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