Modelli dinamici del sindacato: estensioni e critiche

Bruno Chiarini and Enrico Marchetti

Economia politica, 2000, issue 1, 113-148

Abstract: In this paper we will describe the basic features of the standard dynamic model of monopoly union in a critical perspective; starting by the Kidd-Oswald-Jones-McKenna dynamic models, we will suggest some extensions and developments, aimed to underline the importance of the strategic aspects ignored by the standard literature. By means of the theorems and concepts peculiar to the differential game theory, we will show the different solutions, in terms of wages and employment, due to the explicit analysis of the strategic-dynamic interaction between union and firms, together with the biases due to the use of the static models.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:jb33yl:doi:10.1428/1972:y:2000:i:1:p:113-148

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