Reasonable Rules of Choice

Carlo Beretta

Economia politica, 2014, issue 3, 413-426

Abstract: Players have consonant interests if each has a strategy favourable to the pursuit of his own and the interests of the others when the latter adopt a best response. Reasonableness is to move according to such a strategy at the stage reached, reaping the gains this generates. Some overt games hide an underlying game in the choice of rules of choice in which reasonableness is substantively rational, credible and leads to a state that Pareto dominates the Nash equilibria of the original game. The paper contains an application to the finite prisoner's dilemma.

Date: 2014
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