The role of bondholder coordination in freeze-out exchange offers

Flavio Bazzana and Eleonora Broccardo

Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, 2013, issue 1, 67-84

Abstract: This paper develops a model to assess the potential for unfairness in freeze-out bond covenant exchange offers by highlighting the role played by coordination among bondholders. We show that (i) shareholders have an incentive to always structure an exchange offer unfairly and (ii) the coordination costs are positively related to the unfairness of the exchange offer. By improving coordination, bondholders can obtain better contractual conditions, not only with regard to exchange offers, but also in bond issues.

Keywords: Freeze-Out, Covenant; Bond; Coordination Costs (JEL Codes: G12, G32) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.12831/73633 (application/pdf)
https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.12831/73633 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:jdp901:doi:10.12831/73633:y:2013:i:1:p:67-84

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions from Società editrice il Mulino
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().