Still on Uber: The Dilemma of the Judge and the Inertia of the Legislator
Samuel Scandola
Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2021, issue 2, 395-422
Abstract:
Claiming to be a mere intermediary, Uber offered a trasportation service, evading strict industry regulation. This placed the courts in a dilemma: either remove Uber from the regulation of taxi drivers, favoring the efficiency brought by the technology, at the expense of the negative externalities that it entails in the absence of rules. Or impose Uber to submit to the legal regime of the sector, renouncing the benefits brought by technological efficiency, while preserving the protection of consumers and workers guaranteed by the existing discipline. The essay, after briefly reviewing the event of Uber’s jurisprudence, highlights how the platform’s technology makes it possible to overcome the market failures that had justified industry regulation. Furthermore, it highlights how a lean platform – such as Uber – is not necessarily destined to monopolize the market. For this reason, a liberalization of the market is called for, without, however, renouncing to a minimum discipline that guarantees the safety of consumers and a labor and social security for drivers.
Keywords: Sharing Economy; Transportation Industry; European Law. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:jhpfyn:doi:10.1434/102669:y:2021:i:2:p:395-422
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