Lo "spettro" delle frequenze radio

Tommaso Valletti and Andrea Prat

Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2000, issue 3, 565-582

Abstract: Economic theory, as well as various countries' experiences, show that auctioning the spectrum works better than other allocation methods, such as beauty contests. As well as raising revenues, a well-designed auction assigns licences to the operators best able to use them. Auctions can also be designed to advance public-policy goals. In this paper, we discuss some common misunderstandings about auctions. We also consider the need for asymmetric regulations for the next generation of mobile services in terms of bandwidth, roaming and coverage constraints.

Date: 2000
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