Il "vote-trading" nel diritto societario americano

Ettore Scimemi

Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2003, issue 3, 439-464

Abstract: The article - which summarizes some of the ideas developed in a book about corporate vote-buying - provides a critical analysis of Delaware Courts' liberal tendency towards corporate vote trading. It seems that, at least with regard to this issue, Delaware's is not a race to the top. Vote-buying is at best unuseful in a world of shareholder unanimity, it is socially inefficient if shareholders preferences differ but all have the same intensity, and it has indeterminate results when preference intensity is allowed to vary.

Date: 2003
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