Distribution Agreements as Monipolisation. Insights from the "United States v. Google Case"

Maria Casoria

Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2025, issue 1, 159-186

Abstract: The paper discusses the groundbreaking opinion delivered last summer by Judge Amit P. Mehta of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the "United States et al. v. Google LLC case («Google Search»)". This decision found Google liable for Maria Casoria 186 monopolisation in the relevant product markets of general search services and general search text advertising in the Us in breach of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the legal framework established in the renowned case against Microsoft in the early 2000s. The ruling raises several interesting questions about fair competition and duty to deal, the role of data as a consolidating market strategy and as a barrier to entry for rivals, and the right balance between innovation, competition, and consumer choices. The opinion is particularly significant because Judge Mehta found that exclusive distribution agreements, usually scrutinised from the perspective of cartel collusion, can be a means to maintaining monopoly power and, despite declaring Google liable, declined to impose sanctions. The case recently returned to the spotlight due to the ongoing remedies trial, where the Us Department of Justice is arguing in favour of sweeping measures, including a possible breakup of Google. The final decision is expected for the summer of this year.

Keywords: Google Search Case; Monopolisation; Exclusive distribution agreements; Section 2 Sherman Act; Market for general search services; Market for general search text advertising; Us case law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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