Valutazione antitrust delle concentrazioni in mercati oligopolistici

Michele Grillo () and Lara Magnani

Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2004, issue 1, 217-238

Abstract: How can dominance be detected in oligopolistic markets as a result of a merger? Oligopoly is the realm of "interdependent" behaviour. Thus the well-established definition of the ECJ, that identifies dominance with "independent" behaviour, is inappropriate to oligopolistic markets. In the paper we suggest that a dominant position should be detected whenever a merger induces a "stable and asymmetric change" in the merging firm's strategic incentives, as compared with those of the rival firms. Following the suggested interpretation, we show that the European test of "dominance" is equivalent to the US test of "substantial lessening of competition".

Date: 2004
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