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Rosella Creatini

Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2001, issue 3, 505-518

Abstract: The use of price fixing policies has always caracterized the Italian editorial sector, both in the form of collusive agreements between editors and in the form of specific regulatory laws. First, the paper describes the evolution of the competitive structure of this industry; secondly it contains different economic arguments to sustain the absence of economic reasons to introduce a resale price maintenance mechanism. Finally, the paper straightforwards the negative consequences of this mechanism, in terms of competition between editors (interbrand competition) and between traditional bookstores and supermarkets (intra-interbrand competition), that is in terms of price increase, quality decrease and lower differentiation in services and books supplied.

Date: 2001
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