EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Il protezionismo siderurgico statunitense: un boomerang d'acciaio

Daniela Carere and Carlo Scarpa

Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2005, issue 1, 119-144

Abstract: The trade war between the USA and Asia (and the EU as well) involving steel protection shows how protectionism has mainly covered the inefficiency of the US steel industry, which has never accepted the idea of restructuring. In line with what economic theory suggests, the costs for the US economy have been larger than the benefits. However, helping the steel industry - which is concentrated in few key States - has probably helped in a decisive way G.W. Bush to gain a second mandate.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.1434/19642 (application/pdf)
https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1434/19642 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:jhpfyn:doi:10.1434/19642:y:2005:i:1:p:119-144

Access Statistics for this article

Mercato Concorrenza Regole is currently edited by Giuliano Amato

More articles in Mercato Concorrenza Regole from Società editrice il Mulino
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:mul:jhpfyn:doi:10.1434/19642:y:2005:i:1:p:119-144