Note su una creatura non nata: il disegno di legge sulla tutela del risparmio
Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2005, issue 2, 425-444
Following two corporate scandals (Parmalat and Cirio), the Italian Parliament endeavoured to provide a legislative reaction as quick and effectives as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States. So far this effort has failed: with few monthes left before the elections, the upper Chamber is still busy in a second reading of the version approved by the Chamber of Deputies. The article examines some of the more controversial measures of the bill under examination: in particular those regarding the election of directors representing minority shareholders and the constraints on transactions with related parties and those seeking to prevent conflicts of interest between financial institutions and investors. In the framework of the new discipline of sanctions, some issues regarding the structure and organization of the Italian securities commissions are also considered.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:jhpfyn:doi:10.1434/20609:y:2005:i:2:p:425-444
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