Search algorithms and the boundaries of antitrust law and economics

Alberto Urso

Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2013, issue 1, 45-82

Abstract: The paper examines the conducts that are the object of the investigations for abuseof dominance brought against Google by the European Commission and the FederalTrade Commission, with particular emphasis on the manipulation of natural searchalgorithms. Brought the relevant market within the category of two-sided platforms,the paper focuses on the nature of the product or service provided by the search enginethrough the delivery of results, that is to be qualified as an information. For thisreason, the incidence of the alteration of the algorithms on consumer choice as wellas the subsequent prejudice to competitors directly arise from the information giventhrough the search results, rather than from a commercial behavior of the company.As a result such manipolative conduct, since it is not based on any commercial behaviorcapable of direct disturbance of market dynamics, does not involve any antitrustissues. As a consequence, other remedies are needed for the conduct under evaluation,the informative nature of which leads to make reference to unfair competitionand detractive behaviors regulation to protect competitors, as well as to misleadingcommercial practices provisions in consumer protection.

Keywords: antitrust, competition, abuse of dominance, multi-sided market, network externalities; search neutrality, anticompetitive foreclosure, search engines, search algorithms, unfair competition, misleading commercial practices. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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