Of Elevators and Financing, and Damages «Outside the Umbrella», I Sing

Cecilia Carli

Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2020, issue 1, 207-223

Abstract: For the first time ever, the Eu Court of Justice dealt with a case of (alleged) antitrustdamages where the claimant was not an undertaking who had purchased goodsaffected by the anticompetitive agreement, rather a body granting subsidies relatedto the goods covered by the cartel. The scope of one of private enforcement’s milestonessince the Manfredi case – namely that «any person» shall be entitled to seekcompensation for damages caused by an infringement of competition law – hasbeen generously extended through the removal of the necessary link between thosecompanies participating in an illicit agreement and their direct or indirect purchasers:in the Otis case, the Court clarified that the «chain» of entities entitled to seekcompensation also extends to those subjects who played a role in creating demandin the relevant market. And it is not necessary that the loss suffered by the interestedparty – in this case an alleged damage for loss of investment chance – has a specificconnection with the «objective of protection» pursued by Article 101 Tfeu. The rulingmarks a renewed tension between the compensatory function of antitrust damagesand a sort of market protection that seems to yearn towards a greater deterrent effectthrough the extension of subjects entitled to seek compensation. But there it stillremains the need to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient causal link between the alleged damage and the relevant conduct, which seems to remain an uphill road.Much ado about nothing?

Keywords: Competition law damages; Reasonable foreseeability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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