La Consob: un legislatore-giudice "dimezzato"?

Matteo Rescigno

Stato e mercato, 2001, issue 1, 107-134

Abstract: The goal of this article is to analyze the role which the Consob can play, in the system of the sources, in completing the listed company's corporate governance rules. In the first part of the paper, once that the institutional frame in which the Consob operates shall be drawn, there will be emphasized both the possible advantages and the limits of the choice "authority", and particular attention shall be given to the interaction of such advantages and limits with the other sources of law. Subsequently, the attention shall be brought on the problem of the "surveillance" on the set of rules issued by the Consob. Getting the cue from in re Ina-Generali and from the latest administrative proceeding reforms, there shall be raised the serious doubt that the system which is taking shape shall involve a considerable sacrifice for the authority's independence, for the certainty of the rules and for the precision of the final decision.

Date: 2001
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