Selezione dei fornitori e incentivi alla rinegoziazione in contratti incompleti: rilevanza empirica nel settore dei lavori pubblici

Calogero Guccio (), Giacomo Pignataro and Ilde Rizzo

Rivista italiana degli economisti, 2009, issue 2, 311-344

Abstract: The literature on public procurement pays great attention to the rules underlying tendering procedures as well as on the specification of the type of contract to be awarded. Less attention has been paid to the incompleteness of the contract; this issue is relevant in the public work sector because it offers room for the contract renegotiation and, therefore, for the increase of the final price. This paper offers empirical evidence of the potential effects of different tendering procedures (i.e. negotiation vs auction) on the contract renegotiation in the public work sector. The results show that, in presence of incomplete contracts, an excessive emphasis on the tendering rules, in absence of an efficient system of sanctions and incentives, can induce firms to behave strategically: they will offer very low bids to be awarded the contract, looking for renegotiating during the contract implementation.

Keywords: incomplete contracts; procurement; public work (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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