Il razionamento del credito come meccanismo di trasmissione della politica monetaria in un modello di gestione della liquidità

Giovanni Cesaroni

Rivista italiana degli economisti, 1999, issue 1, 73-106

Abstract: This paper, specifying the effects that liquidity management has on the profit function of a generic bank facing an adverse selection problem a là Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), gives a microeconomic foundation, of a partial equilibrium nature, of credit rationing as a transmission mechanism of monetary policy (Blinder 1987). We derive some comparative statics effects very similar to those obtained from Bernanke and Blinder (1992) econometric model. Our model transforms the Pareto-optimal equilibrium with credit rationing into a Pareto-dominated one, exemplifying how the size of agency costs stemming from informational asymmetries may depend on liquidity, a circumstance that is currently being underrated by the contemporary banking theory.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.1427/3651 (application/pdf)
https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1427/3651 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:jqat1f:doi:10.1427/3651:y:1999:i:1:p:73-106

Access Statistics for this article

Rivista italiana degli economisti is currently edited by Giuliano Conti

More articles in Rivista italiana degli economisti from Società editrice il Mulino
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().