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Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?

Lea Melnikovová ()
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Lea Melnikovová: Department of International Business, Metropolitan University Prague, Prokopova 100/16, 130 00 Praha 3 – Žižkov, Czech Republic

Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 2017, vol. 65, issue 4, 1393-1401

Abstract: This paper focuses on methods to resolve the ongoing conflict between countries in the Syrdarya Basin, namely Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, over water allocation. It addresses the problem by using the cooperative games framework. It identifies difficulties of choosing the most suitable solution to the Nash bargaining problem under the current circumstances and also reveals complications that may obstruct negotiations on water allocation. The latter is done by using a simplified model from a different subject field which explains why the negotiations have sequential character. The Kalai‑Smorodinsky solution is recommended as optimal in the concrete situation because it takes into account efficiency of water use of the involved parties and its sequential use leads to a Pareto‑optimal outcome. Also a compromise between the Kalai‑Smorodinsky and dictator solutions can be considered for the current case.

Keywords: water allocation problem; Syrdarya Basin; negotiations; game theory; cooperative games; Nash bargaining problem; Kalai‑Smorodinsky solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.11118/actaun201765041393

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