How Decision-Making Fails Under the Sunshine Laws: An Agency Based Model

Michael M. Tansey
Additional contact information
Michael M. Tansey: Rockhurst University

Journal of Economic Insight, 2006, vol. 32, issue 1, 41-55

Abstract: Sunshine laws can lead to the failure of decision-making processes. This paper tests an agency-based simulation model for the effects of opening up a persuasion process. Not only does openness lessen the likelihood of agreement in this example, it leads to the failure of the persuasion process itself. The requirement to open meetings leads to barriers-to-agreement among decision makers which lower the possibility for decisiveness, raise the decision-making costs, increase bias, and exclude decision-makers from having an impact on collective choices. Any advantages of open meeting requirements to limit government powers must be weighed against the advantages of closed meetings in permitting decision-makers the openness to achieve agreement.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mve:journl:v:32:y:2006:i:1:p:41-55

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Insight is currently edited by Christopher Douglas and Joshua Lewer

More articles in Journal of Economic Insight from Missouri Valley Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cullen Goenner ().