Indirect reciprocity with simple records

Daniel Clark, Drew Fudenberg and Alexander Wolitzky
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Daniel Clark: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2020, vol. 117, issue 21, 11344-11349

Abstract: Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation. Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: Image-scoring models fail to provide robust incentives, while social-standing models are not informationally robust. Here we provide a model of indirect reciprocity based on simple, decentralized records: Each individual’s record depends on the individual’s own past behavior alone, and not on the individual’s partners’ past behavior or their partners’ partners’ past behavior. When social dilemmas exhibit a coordination motive (or strategic complementarity), tolerant trigger strategies based on simple records can robustly support positive social cooperation and exhibit strong stability properties. In the opposite case of strategic substitutability, positive social cooperation cannot be robustly supported. Thus, the strength of short-run coordination motives in social dilemmas determines the prospects for robust long-run cooperation.

Keywords: indirect reciprocity; robust cooperation; strategic complementarity; strategic substitutability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nas:journl:v:117:y:2020:p:11344-11349

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