Spatial social dilemmas promote diversity
Christoph Hauert and
Michael Doebeli
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Christoph Hauert: a Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada;; b Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
Michael Doebeli: a Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada;; b Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2021, vol. 118, issue 42, e2105252118
Abstract:
Evolutionary branching and diversification in interactions with continuous behavioral traits is important for understanding the emergence of distinct, discrete, and coexisting strategies. In social dilemmas, this suggests an evolutionary pathway for the origin of cooperators and defectors. Here we study evolutionary diversification in structured populations and identify mechanisms driving spontaneous and persistent diversification. Through analytical and numerical techniques, we demonstrate that spatial structure admits new modes of diversification that complement classical evolutionary branching. In particular, when selection is strong, diversification tends to occur more readily than in unstructured populations.
Keywords: social dilemmas; adaptive dynamics; structured populations; continuous games; evolutionary branching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nas:journl:v:118:y:2021:p:e2105252118
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