A bargaining game analysis of international climate negotiations

Rory Smead (), Ronald L. Sandler, Patrick Forber and John Basl
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Rory Smead: Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Ave Boston, Massachusetts 02115, USA
Ronald L. Sandler: Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Ave Boston, Massachusetts 02115, USA
Patrick Forber: Tufts University, 14 Upper Campus Road Medford, Massachusetts 02155, USA
John Basl: Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Ave Boston, Massachusetts 02115, USA

Nature Climate Change, 2014, vol. 4, issue 6, 442-445

Abstract: Progress towards reaching an international climate agreement has been painfully slow and fraught with difficulty. This work presents a newly developed game theoretic model aimed at the conceptual clarification of some key obstacles in current international negotiations. The model is then used to suggest possible solutions to these obstacles.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1038/nclimate2229

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