Strategic reasoning and bargaining in catastrophic climate change games

Vilhelm Verendel (), Daniel J. A. Johansson and Kristian Lindgren
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Vilhelm Verendel: Chalmers University of Technology
Daniel J. A. Johansson: Chalmers University of Technology
Kristian Lindgren: Chalmers University of Technology

Nature Climate Change, 2016, vol. 6, issue 3, 265-268

Abstract: A game theory experiment shows that it is easier to reach an agreement to avert the worst impacts of climate change when a catastrophic threshold is known. It also shows that countries’ use of strategic reasoning puts such agreements at risk.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1038/nclimate2849

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