Human cooperation in changing groups in a large-scale public goods game

Kasper Otten (), Ulrich J. Frey, Vincent Buskens, Wojtek Przepiorka and Naomi Ellemers
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Kasper Otten: Utrecht University, Department of Sociology/ICS
Ulrich J. Frey: Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Faculty of Biology and Chemistry
Vincent Buskens: Utrecht University, Department of Sociology/ICS
Wojtek Przepiorka: Utrecht University, Department of Sociology/ICS
Naomi Ellemers: Utrecht University, Department of Psychology

Nature Communications, 2022, vol. 13, issue 1, 1-11

Abstract: Abstract How people cooperate to provide public goods is an important scientific question and relates to many societal problems. Previous research studied how people cooperate in stable groups in repeated or one-time-only encounters. However, most real-world public good problems occur in groups with a gradually changing composition due to old members leaving and new members arriving. How group changes are related to cooperation in public good provision is not well understood. To address this issue, we analyze a dataset from an online public goods game comprising approximately 1.5 million contribution decisions made by about 135 thousand players in about 11.3 thousand groups with about 234 thousand changes in group composition. We find that changes in group composition negatively relate to cooperation. Our results suggest that this is related to individuals contributing less in the role of newcomers than in the role of incumbents. During the process of moving from newcomer status to incumbent status, individuals cooperate more and more in line with incumbents.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1038/s41467-022-34160-5

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