A fish cartel for Africa

Gabriel Englander () and Christopher Costello
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Gabriel Englander: The World Bank
Christopher Costello: University of California

Nature Communications, 2023, vol. 14, issue 1, 1-10

Abstract: Abstract Many countries sell fishing rights to foreign nations and fishers. Although African coastal waters are among the world’s most biologically rich, African countries earn much less than their peers from selling access to foreign fishers. African countries sell fishing access individually (in contrast to some Pacific countries who sell access as a bloc). We develop a bilateral oligopoly model to simulate the effects of an African fish cartel. The model shows that wielding market power entails both ecological and economic dimensions. Africa would substantially restrict access catch, which raises biomass by 16%. But this also confers economic benefits to all African nations, raising profits by an average of 23%. These benefits arise because market power shifts from foreign buyers to African sellers. While impediments to sustainable development like corruption are hard to change in the medium-term, deeper African integration is an already-emerging solution to African countries’ economic and ecological challenges.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-42886-z

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