The evolution of democratic peace in animal societies

K. L. Hunt (), M. Patel, D. P. Croft, D. W. Franks, P. A. Green, F. J. Thompson, R. A. Johnstone, M. A. Cant and D. W. E. Sankey ()
Additional contact information
K. L. Hunt: University of Exeter, Penryn Campus
M. Patel: University of Hull
D. P. Croft: University of Exeter
D. W. Franks: University of York
P. A. Green: University of California
F. J. Thompson: University of Exeter, Penryn Campus
R. A. Johnstone: University of Cambridge
M. A. Cant: University of Exeter, Penryn Campus
D. W. E. Sankey: University of Exeter, Penryn Campus

Nature Communications, 2024, vol. 15, issue 1, 1-8

Abstract: Abstract A major goal in evolutionary biology is to elucidate common principles that drive human and other animal societies to adopt either a warlike or peaceful nature. One proposed explanation for the variation in aggression between human societies is the democratic peace hypothesis. According to this theory, autocracies are more warlike than democracies because autocratic leaders can pursue fights for private gain. However, autocratic and democratic decision-making processes are not unique to humans and are widely observed across a diverse range of non-human animal societies. We use evolutionary game theory to evaluate whether the logic of democratic peace may apply across taxa; specifically adapting the classic Hawk-Dove model to consider conflict decisions made by groups rather than individuals. We find support for the democratic peace hypothesis without mechanisms involving complex human institutions and discuss how these findings might be relevant to non-human animal societies. We suggest that the degree to which collective decisions are shared may explain variation in the intensity of intergroup conflict in nature.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1038/s41467-024-50621-5

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