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The self-reference memory bias is preceded by an other-reference bias in infancy

Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann (), Katrin Rothmaler, Esra Hasan, Kathrine Habdank, Chen Yang, Emanuela Yeung and Victoria Southgate
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Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann: Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences
Katrin Rothmaler: Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences
Esra Hasan: Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences
Kathrine Habdank: University of Copenhagen
Chen Yang: Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences
Emanuela Yeung: University of Copenhagen
Victoria Southgate: University of Copenhagen

Nature Communications, 2025, vol. 16, issue 1, 1-8

Abstract: Abstract One of the most established biases in human memory is that we remember information better when it refers to ourselves. We investigated the development of this self-reference effect and its relationship with the emergence of a self-concept. We presented 18-month-old infants with objects that were assigned either to them, or to another agent. Infants were then tested on their memory for the objects by presenting them with an image of each object, alongside a modified version of it. Mirror self-recognition served as an index of self-concept emergence. Infants who recognize themselves in the mirror remember objects assigned to themselves better than those assigned to the other. In contrast, non-self-recognizers only remember the objects assigned to the other rather than themselves. This difference is not explained by differences in infants’ age or inhibitory abilities. This suggests that the self-reference effect emerges with the development of self-concept in the second year. Prior to the emergence of a self-concept, however, infants instead seem to exhibit an other-reference effect. This reversal of the classic self-reference effect suggests that early in life, when infants are heavily reliant on others for information, they may be biased towards encoding the world as it relates to others.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1038/s41467-025-61642-z

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