EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Emergence of stable polymorphisms driven by evolutionary games between mutants

Weini Huang, Bernhard Haubold, Christoph Hauert and Arne Traulsen ()
Additional contact information
Weini Huang: Evolutionary Theory Group, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology
Bernhard Haubold: Bioinformatics Group, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology
Christoph Hauert: The University of British Columbia
Arne Traulsen: Evolutionary Theory Group, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology

Nature Communications, 2012, vol. 3, issue 1, 1-7

Abstract: Abstract Under neutrality, polymorphisms are maintained through the balance between mutation and drift. Under selection, a variety of mechanisms may be involved in the maintenance of polymorphisms, for example, sexual selection or host-parasite coevolution on the population level or heterozygote advantage in diploid individuals. Here we address the emergence of polymorphisms in a population of interacting haploid individuals. In our model, each mutation generates a new evolutionary game characterized by a payoff matrix with an additional row and an additional column. Hence, in general, the fitness of new mutations is frequency-dependent rather than constant. This dynamical process is distinct from the sequential fixation of advantageous traits and naturally leads to the emergence of polymorphisms under selection. It causes substantially higher diversity than observed under the established models of neutral or frequency-independent selection. Our framework allows for the coexistence of an arbitrary number of types, but predicts an intermediate average diversity.

Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms1930 Abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nat:natcom:v:3:y:2012:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms1930

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.nature.com/ncomms/

DOI: 10.1038/ncomms1930

Access Statistics for this article

Nature Communications is currently edited by Nathalie Le Bot, Enda Bergin and Fiona Gillespie

More articles in Nature Communications from Nature
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:3:y:2012:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms1930