Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything

Christoph Adami () and Arend Hintze
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Christoph Adami: Michigan State University
Arend Hintze: Michigan State University

Nature Communications, 2013, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-8

Abstract: Abstract Zero-determinant strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner’s Dilemma irrespective of the opponent’s strategy (coercive strategies), or else to set the ratio between the player’s and their opponent’s expected payoff (extortionate strategies). Here we show that zero-determinant strategies are at most weakly dominant, are not evolutionarily stable, and will instead evolve into less coercive strategies. We show that zero-determinant strategies with an informational advantage over other players that allows them to recognize each other can be evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an advantage is bound to be short-lived as opposing strategies evolve to counteract the recognition.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1038/ncomms3193

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