Resource heterogeneity can facilitate cooperation
Ádám Kun () and
Ulf Dieckmann
Additional contact information
Ádám Kun: Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Advanced System Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
Ulf Dieckmann: Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Advanced System Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
Nature Communications, 2013, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-8
Abstract:
Abstract Although social structure is known to promote cooperation, by locally exposing selfish agents to their own deeds, studies to date assumed that all agents have access to the same level of resources. This is clearly unrealistic. Here we find that cooperation can be maintained when some agents have access to more resources than others. Cooperation can then emerge even in populations in which the temptation to defect is so strong that players would act fully selfishly if their resources were distributed uniformly. Resource heterogeneity can thus be crucial for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We also show that resource heterogeneity can hinder cooperation once the temptation to defect is significantly lowered. In all cases, the level of cooperation can be maximized by managing resource heterogeneity.
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms3453 Abstract (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nat:natcom:v:4:y:2013:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms3453
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.nature.com/ncomms/
DOI: 10.1038/ncomms3453
Access Statistics for this article
Nature Communications is currently edited by Nathalie Le Bot, Enda Bergin and Fiona Gillespie
More articles in Nature Communications from Nature
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().