Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation

David G. Rand (), Alexander Peysakhovich, Gordon T. Kraft-Todd, George E. Newman, Owen Wurzbacher, Martin A. Nowak and Joshua D. Greene
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David G. Rand: Yale University
Alexander Peysakhovich: Yale University
Gordon T. Kraft-Todd: Yale University
George E. Newman: Yale School of Management, Yale University
Owen Wurzbacher: Yale University
Martin A. Nowak: Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University
Joshua D. Greene: Harvard University

Nature Communications, 2014, vol. 5, issue 1, 1-12

Abstract: Abstract Cooperation is central to human societies. Yet relatively little is known about the cognitive underpinnings of cooperative decision making. Does cooperation require deliberate self-restraint? Or is spontaneous prosociality reined in by calculating self-interest? Here we present a theory of why (and for whom) intuition favors cooperation: cooperation is typically advantageous in everyday life, leading to the formation of generalized cooperative intuitions. Deliberation, by contrast, adjusts behaviour towards the optimum for a given situation. Thus, in one-shot anonymous interactions where selfishness is optimal, intuitive responses tend to be more cooperative than deliberative responses. We test this ‘social heuristics hypothesis’ by aggregating across every cooperation experiment using time pressure that we conducted over a 2-year period (15 studies and 6,910 decisions), as well as performing a novel time pressure experiment. Doing so demonstrates a positive average effect of time pressure on cooperation. We also find substantial variation in this effect, and show that this variation is partly explained by previous experience with one-shot lab experiments.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1038/ncomms4677

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