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Evolutionary games of condensates in coupled birth–death processes

Johannes Knebel, Markus F. Weber, Torben Krüger and Erwin Frey ()
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Johannes Knebel: Arnold Sommerfeld Center for Theoretical Physics and Center for NanoScience, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Markus F. Weber: Arnold Sommerfeld Center for Theoretical Physics and Center for NanoScience, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Torben Krüger: IST Austria, Am Campus 1
Erwin Frey: Arnold Sommerfeld Center for Theoretical Physics and Center for NanoScience, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Nature Communications, 2015, vol. 6, issue 1, 1-9

Abstract: Abstract Condensation phenomena arise through a collective behaviour of particles. They are observed in both classical and quantum systems, ranging from the formation of traffic jams in mass transport models to the macroscopic occupation of the energetic ground state in ultra-cold bosonic gases (Bose–Einstein condensation). Recently, it has been shown that a driven and dissipative system of bosons may form multiple condensates. Which states become the condensates has, however, remained elusive thus far. The dynamics of this condensation are described by coupled birth–death processes, which also occur in evolutionary game theory. Here we apply concepts from evolutionary game theory to explain the formation of multiple condensates in such driven-dissipative bosonic systems. We show that the vanishing of relative entropy production determines their selection. The condensation proceeds exponentially fast, but the system never comes to rest. Instead, the occupation numbers of condensates may oscillate, as we demonstrate for a rock–paper–scissors game of condensates.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nat:natcom:v:6:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms7977

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DOI: 10.1038/ncomms7977

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