Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness

Johannes G. Reiter, Christian Hilbe, David G. Rand, Krishnendu Chatterjee and Martin A. Nowak ()
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Johannes G. Reiter: Harvard University
Christian Hilbe: IST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria)
David G. Rand: Yale University
Krishnendu Chatterjee: IST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria)
Martin A. Nowak: Harvard University

Nature Communications, 2018, vol. 9, issue 1, 1-8

Abstract: Abstract Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation among humans. Many of our daily interactions are repeated. We interact repeatedly with our family, friends, colleagues, members of the local and even global community. In the theory of repeated games, it is a tacit assumption that the various games that a person plays simultaneously have no effect on each other. Here we introduce a general framework that allows us to analyze “crosstalk” between a player’s concurrent games. In the presence of crosstalk, the action a person experiences in one game can alter the person’s decision in another. We find that crosstalk impedes the maintenance of cooperation and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. The magnitude of the effect depends on the population structure. In more densely connected social groups, crosstalk has a stronger effect. A harsh retaliator, such as Tit-for-Tat, is unable to counteract crosstalk. The crosstalk framework provides a unified interpretation of direct and upstream reciprocity in the context of repeated games.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8

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