Flexible updating of beliefs in order to forgive

Alexander Todorov ()
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Alexander Todorov: Princeton University

Nature Human Behaviour, 2018, vol. 2, issue 10, 722-723

Abstract: We rapidly make inferences about the moral character of others. Observing a single immoral behaviour is often sufficient to make us think of them as morally ‘unworthy’. But our beliefs about others’ ‘badness’ (as opposed to ‘goodness’) are more uncertain. That is, we allow ourselves more space to re-assess and, if needed, rectify these beliefs.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1038/s41562-018-0442-0

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