Accuracy and social motivations shape judgements of (mis)information
Steve Rathje (),
Jon Roozenbeek,
Jay J. Bavel and
Sander Linden ()
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Steve Rathje: University of Cambridge
Jon Roozenbeek: University of Cambridge
Jay J. Bavel: New York University
Sander Linden: University of Cambridge
Nature Human Behaviour, 2023, vol. 7, issue 6, 892-903
Abstract:
Abstract The extent to which belief in (mis)information reflects lack of knowledge versus a lack of motivation to be accurate is unclear. Here, across four experiments (n = 3,364), we motivated US participants to be accurate by providing financial incentives for correct responses about the veracity of true and false political news headlines. Financial incentives improved accuracy and reduced partisan bias in judgements of headlines by about 30%, primarily by increasing the perceived accuracy of true news from the opposing party (d = 0.47). Incentivizing people to identify news that would be liked by their political allies, however, decreased accuracy. Replicating prior work, conservatives were less accurate at discerning true from false headlines than liberals, yet incentives closed the gap in accuracy between conservatives and liberals by 52%. A non-financial accuracy motivation intervention was also effective, suggesting that motivation-based interventions are scalable. Altogether, these results suggest that a substantial portion of people’s judgements of the accuracy of news reflects motivational factors.
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nat:nathum:v:7:y:2023:i:6:d:10.1038_s41562-023-01540-w
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DOI: 10.1038/s41562-023-01540-w
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